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XLab is an early warning system that addresses a 
broad range of national security threats using a 
flexible, rapidly reconfigurable architecture. XLab 
enables intelligence analysts to visualize, explore, 
and query a knowledge base constructed from 
multiple data sources, guided by subject matter 
expertise codified in threat model graphs.  
This paper describes a novel system prototype 
that addresses threats arising from biological 
weapons of mass destruction. The prototype applies 
knowledge extraction analytics—including link 
estimation, entity disambiguation, and event 
detection—to build a knowledge base of 40 million 
entities and 140 million relationships from open 
sources.  
Exact and inexact subgraph matching analytics 
enable analysts to search the knowledge base for 
instances of modeled threats. The paper introduces   
new methods for inexact matching that accommodate 
threat models with temporal and geospatial patterns. 
System performance is demonstrated using several 








As a result of diverse trends in globalization, 
communications, and advanced technology diffusion, 
many nations today face a variety of security 
challenges from peer nations, rogue or failed states, 
and criminal and terrorist organizations. Many of 
these same trends have also vastly increased the 
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volume of heterogeneous data that intelligence 
analysts must search to detect these threats. The 
volume of open source data in particular is expected 
to continue to grow exponentially, with estimates that 
the digital universe will grow by a factor of 10—from 
4.4 trillion gigabytes to 44 trillion gigabytes—
between 2013 and 2020 [1]. The broad range of 
possible threats, combined with the vast quantities of 
data that must be searched to detect them, present 
intelligence analysts with significant challenges.  
XLab is a prototype software system that 
addresses these challenges by providing analysts with 
advanced analytics for extracting early warning 
signals from large volumes of heterogeneous data, 
built on a flexible, rapidly reconfigurable 
architecture. The goal of XLab is to provide analysts 
with the ability to visualize, explore, and query a 
knowledge base constructed from multiple data 
sources and expressed as a graph.   
A key component of XLab is the ability to search 
this graph for instances of threat models, small 
graphs that describe anticipated threatening activity. 
This activity is often of interest not because of the 
characteristics of a single actor or event, but because 
of relationships or activity patterns among a group of 
actors and events. If these relationships are also 
expressed as graphs, then searching the knowledge 
base for threatening activity becomes a graph 
matching problem. One approach is to apply 
subgraph isomorphism algorithms to search the 
knowledge base for data that matches the threat 
models exactly. However, being able to find inexact 
matches is critical as well, because the knowledge 
base may be incomplete due to limited observability 
of threatening activity, because threat models may be 
incomplete due to limited analyst knowledge of threat 
operations, and because it enables discovery of novel 
threats analysts may not have even considered [2]. 
An initial XLab system prototype has been 
constructed that addresses threats associated with 
biological weapons of mass destruction (bio-WMDs). 
The prototype uses open sources to build a 
knowledge base of 40 million entities and 140 





million relationships that can be visualized and 
queried using open source tools. Knowledge 
extraction analytics implemented in the prototype 
include entity disambiguation, link estimation, and 
event detection. Both exact and inexact subgraph 
matching have been implemented for detecting threat 
model instances in the knowledge base. For inexact 
matching, a state-of-the-art algorithm was extended 
to ensure timely response and to accommodate threat 
models with temporal and geospatial patterns. The 
system prototype performance is demonstrated using 
several simplified threat models and an embedded 
scenario. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses related work; Section 3 describes 
knowledge base construction; threat models are 
explained in Section 4; Sections 5 and 6 deal with 
exact and inexact matching, respectively; Section 7 
reports on system-testing efforts; Section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Related work  
 
The rapidly growing amount of information 
available on the internet and in other digital 
repositories poses a serious challenge for intelligence 
analysts. Many questions that analysts face can be 
naturally formulated as graph problems [3], yet many 
challenges remain, ranging from graph construction, 
where relevant data needs to be targeted and 
relationships of interest inferred, to efficient ontology 
and threat model generation, to effective search of the 
knowledge graph for information of interest. In 
addition, these capabilities need to be implemented 
on a flexible architecture that can adapt to rapidly 
evolving threats. 
A number of authors focus on detection of 
biological WMD attacks that have already occurred. 
For example, Paul et al. use hospital data to discover 
anthrax attacks [4], focusing on detection of 
spreading symptoms after the attack. They use an 
inexact graph matching algorithm, Truncated Search 
Tree (TruST) [5], to search a knowledge base for 
instances of a template describing anthrax inhalation 
symptoms. To enable TruST to scale to large data 
sets, various problem-specific heuristics are 
employed. Hu et al. create an agent-based model of a 
bioterrorist attack on connected cities [6] that aims to 
detect a bioterrorism attack before a sizeable 
proportion of the population is infected. 
A related and challenging area is risk 
assessment, which typically relies on probability 
estimates provided by subject matter experts (SMEs). 
Steinberg [7] provides a general Bayesian framework 
and discusses in detail a threat model paradigm that 
takes into consideration the means, motive, and 
opportunity of threat actors. XLab threat models, 
discussed in Section 4, make extensive use of this 
paradigm. Koblentz [8] discusses biases inherent to 
risk estimation of chemical, biological, radiological 
or nuclear (CBRN) weapons use.  
A number of authors address the graph 
isomorphism problem; for example, Carletti et al. [9] 
focus on large, dense graphs, while Babai [10] shows 
that graph isomorphism problem can be solved in 
quasi-polynomial time. By contrast, inexact graph 
matching is a much newer research area and the 
approaches can be basically broken down into two 
categories: index-based and index-free. NeMa [11] is 
an index-based algorithm that indexes the 
neighborhood of every node and uses an iterative 
inference algorithm similar to loopy belief 
propagation. Index-based algorithms tend to not scale 
to large data sets because of the enormous amount of 
storage space required for the index.  
For our work we have selected an algorithm by 
Tong et al. [12] and its extension to highly attributed 
graphs [13] (the authors have also recently modified 
their approach to address iterative subgraph matching 
as query graph gets refined [14]). Tong’s index-free 
algorithm allows for only the essential entities in the 
threat model—the ones that are required to match—
to be specified. Nodes are inserted as needed for best-
effort matches. This approach is attractive because, in 
contrast to indexed approaches, its run time scales 
linearly with graph size (i.e., number of nodes and 
edges). As described in Section 6, we extended the 
approach to incorporate both temporal and geospatial 
properties of threat models. 
 
3. Knowledge base construction 
 
Knowledge base construction is the process of 
data acquisition, information extraction, and 
persistence that results in a database of structured 
information. For XLab, the knowledge base provides 
the inputs to subsequent analysis such as threat 
detection and decision support aids. This section 
describes the knowledge base construction process.  
In the data acquisition phase, we gather 
information from a variety of open sources whose 
subject matter is relevant to the bio-WMD threat 
model. Three data sources were chosen: an academic 
article database that provides information about 
individuals with bio-WMD technical expertise; an 
online social media platform that contributes 
evidence of terror group intent, recruiting, and attack 
planning and execution; and a commercial open-
source service that provides a wide variety of 
documents—as well as entities, relationships, and 
Page 945
events extracted from them—that can be mapped to 
many elements of the threat model.  
As part of the data acquisition phase, filters are 
applied to ensure that data inserted into the 
knowledge base is relevant to the threat model while 
minimizing irrelevant information that can increase 
false alarms, hinder the discovery process, and lead 
to unmanageable knowledge base growth. These 
filters include lists of pathogens, technologies, 
equipment, facilities, individuals, and social media 
accounts known to be associated with either terror 
groups or bio-WMD development. For example, the 
Australia Group Control List of Dual-use Biological 
Equipment provides a list of specialized technical 
equipment; academic articles and textbooks [15] 
provide lists of government and commercial facilities 
associated with dual-use biotechnologies; and several 
websites provide lists of online accounts affiliated 
with terror groups. 
 
 
Figure 1. XLab Objective System Architecture 
 
In the knowledge extraction phase, references to 
entities of interest—such as people, organizations, 
pathogens, locations, facilities, and social media 
accounts—are detected in the data and inserted into 
the knowledge base. A variety of extraction methods 
are used depending on the degree of available 
structure in the underlying data.  
For structured datasets we derive high-
confidence, exact graph representations. For 
example, formatted records in the academic article 
database can be directly parsed to yield authors, 
documents, and associated author/document 
relationships. For unstructured data sources, we use a 
variety of statistically trained named entity 
recognition (NER) models—such as the Stanford 
Named Entity Recognizer [16] and the MIT 
Information Extraction (MITIE) library [17] — 
which detect and label entities in text. Confidence 
scores produced by these methods are stored along 
with data object metadata to enable computation of 
compounded estimates of fact veracity. 
Other forms of knowledge extraction 
implemented include entity disambiguation, link 
estimation, and event detection. Entity 
disambiguation refers to the inference either that a 
single text string refers to several different entities or 
that different strings refer to the same entity. A 
simple token-based string matching approach using a 
Jaro-Winkler distance metric [18] was implemented 
to resolve entities. Link estimation refers to the 
discovery of hidden relationships in the knowledge 
base. For the prototype, a simple link estimation 
algorithm based on n-gram matching was used to link 
real names with online account handles. For both 
entity disambiguation and link estimation, more 
sophisticated analytics incorporating social, textual, 
or spatiotemporal patterns of life and other features 
can be implemented to achieve better performance.  
Finally, event detection refers to the extraction of 
particular types of activities from their textual 
description. The prototype leveraged third party 
analytics to detect events, for example travel events 
of the form “person P traveled to location L” in news 
reports, social media posts, and other text documents. 
The extracted knowledge is represented as a 
multi-directed property graph whose vertices 
represent extracted entities and whose edges 
represent relationships between entities. A property 
graph is a graph in which vertices and edges may 
have associated attributes; for example, a vertex 
representing a person may have first name, last name, 
and date of birth attributes. A multi-directed graph is 
a graph in which vertices may be connected by 
multiple edges, each of which may have an 
associated semantic direction. For instance, if a 
Person entity is the author of a Document entity, an 
edge of type “Wrote” points from the Person to the 
Document. Once the data is processed into this 
representation, it becomes possible to perform 
powerful queries both for single entities and for 
graph template patterns. Such queries are discussed 
further in Sections 5 and 6. A key element of the 
knowledge extraction process is a schema of entity 
and relationship types that enables data to be 
logically organized in a database. 
In addition to the data described above, the 
knowledge base also incorporates data provenance 
information, so that derived data products and alerts 
have a traceable history to their original records. To 
accomplish this, unprocessed data is indexed 
separately from subsequent derived data, and each 
derived record has a reference to its original record. 
This separation also facilitates reprocessing of the 
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original source data as information extraction 
algorithms improve.  
From a software architecture point of view, we 
have incorporated a number of distributed computing 
technologies to enable processing and storage of 
large volumes of data. Figure 2 depicts the 
knowledge base software architecture, showing the 
primary elements of data processing and persistence. 
The architecture is built on a distributed messaging 
bus that accepts parsed raw data and serves as the 
interface for subsequent processing such as 
information extraction and indexing. The sensing and 
knowledge extraction steps described above, 
combined with the software architecture, yielded a 
prototype knowledge base containing approximately 
40 million entities with 140 million relationships 
between them.  
 
 
Figure 2. Graph Construction and Persistence 
Architecture 
 
The volume and complexity of this data lead to 
visualization, exploration, and query construction and 
execution challenges. The XLab objective 
architecture of Figure 1 envisions providing 
intelligence analysts with tools for visualizing small 
regions of the knowledge base; navigating easily 
between regions; adding, deleting, and correcting 
information; constructing graph-based queries using 
an intuitive interface; and automatically generating 
prioritized lists of knowledge base entities or 
subgraphs that correlate with threat models. For the 
prototype, visualization was implemented using the 
open-source Gephi graph visualization tool [19], 
while simple query capability was achieved using 
ElasticSearch [20], an open-source data indexing and 
search tool. The next section describes how threat 
models are designed to enable advanced knowledge 
discovery and threat detection.  
 
4. Threat models 
Threat models encode the knowledge of a subject 
matter expert (SME) about a particular threat into a 
model that can be used to search the knowledge base. 
For the XLab bio-WMD prototype, SME threat 
understanding is conceptualized as a network of 
activity between individuals, groups, locations, and 
critical equipment or resources. This network is 
encoded as a graph that may incorporate any entity or 
link type defined in the knowledge base schema. 
Additionally, temporal and spatial constraints can be 
imposed across a series of entities or links to capture 
a sequence of related activities. Such constraints are 
particularly useful to reduce the number of search 
results for threat models with commonly occurring 
entities.  
When constructing a threat model, SMEs can 
elect to model either a small element of a threat or 
their full threat understanding based on the 
means/motive/opportunity paradigm [7]. 
 
Figure 3. Bio-WMD Threat Model 
Figure 3 depicts an example of a full threat 
model for the bio-WMD threat. In this model, a 
technical expert with relevant knowledge and access 
to a biotechnology facility (means layer) is recruited 
and financed by a terror group (motive layer). 
Together the expert and group plan an attack, develop 
a bio-WMD, travel to an attack site, and deploy the 
weapon (opportunity layer). Once a threat model is 
constructed, it can be used to search the knowledge 
base for matches that may indicate real-world 
threatening activity.  Techniques for conducting such 
searches are described in the next two sections. 
 
5. Exact graph matching 
 
Once a knowledge base and threat model have 
been constructed, tools are needed for finding 
matches to the threat model and supporting ad hoc 
exploratory queries. Matches to a particular threat 
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model are considered a form of the subgraph 
isomorphism problem [21], which is the task of 
finding a subgraph H of the data graph G that is 
isomorphic to the threat model graph or “query 
graph” Q. Isomorphism between graphs H and Q 
means that there is a one-to-one mapping or bijection 
between the two vertex sets 𝑓: 𝑉(𝐻) → 𝑉(𝑄) and that 
any two vertices (𝑢, 𝑣) in H are adjacent if and only 
if 𝑓(𝑢) and 𝑓(𝑣) are adjacent in Q. Isomorphism 
preserves structure. Also, H is a subgraph of G if the 
vertices and edges in H form a subset of the vertices 
and edges in G. Exact graph matching implies strict 
subgraph structure and attribute matches, as opposed 
to inexact graph matching, for which small deviations 
from the query structure and attributes are allowed. 
Section 6 is devoted to inexact graph matching. 
The advantage of constructing a graph of 
interrelated records is that it supports more complex 
queries than a traditional search engine that finds 
keyword matches to single records stored in isolation. 
For example, suppose an analyst is interested in using 
academic citation data to uncover collaborations or 
expertise transfer between laboratories. With 
traditional search engines, the process would be 
laborious and many searches would be required. On 
the other hand, when this information is encoded as a 
graph of Author, Facility, and Article nodes as shown 
in Figure 4, the desired relationships are also encoded 
implicitly, and the same query is represented simply 
as a small graph of relationships among the entities in 
question, shown in Figure 5. Searching the 
knowledge base for isomorphic matches to this graph 
enables the analyst to find results quickly and 
automatically, as shown in the example of Figure 6. 
In addition to finding the pattern of interest, the 
analyst can also easily access rich contextual 
information, such as the co-authors that are related to 
the author in question. 
Isomorphic graph matching is implemented in 
the XLab system using iterative graph traversals 
guided by a backtracking algorithm on a search tree. 
For a given threat model, an analyst inputs the graph 
as a set of directed vertex-edge-vertex triples with 
constraints on the vertex and edge properties. The 
algorithm starts by iterating over each triple and 
querying the database for entities matching the set of 
properties specified for the first vertex. These results 
become candidates for graph matches. Then the 
algorithm iterates over each candidate and traverses 
over the edges, filtering edges that do not meet edge 
property constraints, and gathers the terminal node 
for the triple. Each result node becomes another 
candidate for a complete match in a tree-like 
structure. The algorithm exhaustively iterates over 
every candidate and returns complete matches if 
found, or until all candidates have been searched. 
We chose to persist our graph in Elasticsearch, a 
NoSQL document-oriented distributed database. Both 
graph vertices and edges are treated as atomic records 
in the database, where structure is encoded by storing 
vertex IDs in each edge record. Thus, to traverse the 
graph, a series of joins must be done to match 
vertices to their associated edges and then to their 
terminal vertices. This storage approach also allows 
us to perform powerful single-record queries with 
support for geographic, temporal, keyword, and field 
matching queries. 
 




Figure 5. Example Academic Article Query 
 
To scale the graph matching capability, the 
system incorporates Apache Spark, an in-memory 
cluster computing framework. Spark integrates with 
Elasticsearch through Hadoop, which allows fast 
ingest, and GraphFrames allows parallelized graph 
search through an intuitive graph pattern language 
[22]. Without optimization, a full-graph query 
consisting of two nodes (one of type Person and the 
other of type Organization) and an edge connecting 
them takes about 5 minutes to complete on an 8-core 




Figure 6. Exact Matching Result for Example Query 
 
Figure 8 shows some performance metrics for 
various resource configurations. These results were 
computed on a graph of 40 million nodes and 140 
million edges. 
 
Figure 7. Large-Scale Graph Analytics 
 
In order to compare our computing framework to 
existing graph databases, we ran graph matching tests 
between GraphFrames and Titan, the graph database 
management system with Apache Cassandra as the 
storage backend. We persisted a smaller graph 
dataset of 11.8k nodes and 13.8k edges in both 
systems and ran the same query consisting of a 
moderately complex graph of 4 nodes and 4 edges. 
Query performance was comparable: GraphFrames 
averaged about 17.2 seconds while Titan averaged 
about 16.1 seconds.  In addition to search, retrieval, 
and basic statistics offered by graph databases such 
as Titan, our computing framework allows us to 
easily build advanced analytics and algorithms. 
Figure 7 shows an example of such processing in 
which the full data graph has been marginalized into 
a graph of coauthors, labeled using a community 
detection algorithm, then filtered to uncover clusters 
of highly-collaborative researchers. All of these 




Figure 8. Exact Graph Matching Run Times 
 
6. Inexact graph matching 
 
When threat models are only partially 
understood, or when discovery of novel threat 
configurations is of interest, inexact graph matching 
algorithms can be applied to calculate results of 
interest. For inexact matching, we adopted the 
structure of Tong’s algorithm [12] and its extension 
to highly attributed graphs [13], and implemented 
novel approaches to improve run time and to enable 
expanded threat model queries to include temporal 
and spatial relationships.  
 
 
Figure 9. Run times for query graphs of varying 
sizes 
The algorithm returns exact or best-effort 
subgraphs. The number of graphs returned is 
specified by the user. Prior to searching the graph, the 
algorithm calculates random walks with restart values 
to rank nodes based on their proximity to other 
nodes. Using these rankings and the given query 
attributes, a desirable (usually central and well-
connected) seed node is selected. Neighbor nodes are 
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similarly selected by finding the nearest highly 
ranked node that matches another attribute of the 
query graph. After selecting a neighboring node, a 
path is found to connect these nearby neighbors to 
seed nodes. This is done for all nodes in the query 
graph and results in a best effort sub-graph. The 
algorithm run time scales linearly with the size of the 
query graph since each node in the query graph, 
except for the initial node picked by the algorithm, is 
processed sequentially using exactly the same steps 
each time. Figure 9 shows run times for increasing 
sizes of query graphs and increasing number of 
iterations for random walk with restart calculations 
(see [12] and [13] for details). Tong et al. have 
demonstrated empirically that the run time scales 
with the number of nodes and the number of edges in 
the data graph as well. They have shown this on a 
wide variety of graph sizes (see [13] for details). 
Simple model in Figure 10 seeks to uncover 
individuals currently working in a specific U.S. 
geographic area who have previously been employed 
by a non-U.S. biotechnology company. 
 
 
Figure 10. Threat Model 
 
 
Figure 11. Inexact Graph Matching Result 
 
The knowledge graph contains no exact matches 
for this threat model but does contain matches that 
are semantically identical, one of which is shown in 
Figure 11. The algorithm correctly discovers all 9 of 
these matches in the full knowledge graph. Recall in 
this instance is 1 but it should be noted that recall 
varies widely depending on size and structure of both 
the query graph and the data graph, and more 
investigation is needed here. It should also be noted 
that the goal of the algorithm is to present to the 
analyst reasonable matches of interest and that the 
algorithm can easily be combined with SQL-based 
methods for exact match discovery. 
Inexact graph matching is also useful when an 
analyst knows certain connections and nodes of 
interest but does not have a full understanding of the 
various possible connections. For example, the threat 
model in Figure 12 describes a scientist who has 
published on pathogen research and who has also 
communicated online with an individual who is 
associated with an event of interest. A similar threat 
model is discussed further in Section 7. 
 
Figure 12. Threat Model 
 
 
Figure 13. Inexact Graph Matching Results 
 
Figure 13 shows some of the matches returned 
for the query of Figure 12. The node colors represent 
entity types. To evaluate how closely the resulting 
matches correspond to the query graph, we have 
created a goodness score G, defined as 
 
𝐺 =
−2𝑢 − 𝑒 + 3𝑐 + 𝑚
3𝑡 + 𝑞
    (1)  
 
where 
𝑢 =  number of unconnected nodes in result graph 
𝑒 =  number of extra nodes in result graph not in query 
graph 
𝑐 =  number of edges in result graph that connect two 
matching vertices 
𝑚 = number of nodes in result graph matching nodes in 
query graph 
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𝑡 =  number of edges in query graph 
𝑞 =  number of nodes in query graph 
 
 A result graph that perfectly matches a query graph 
receives a score of 1. Figure 14 demonstrates 
calculation of G. 
 
Figure 14. Sample Query (top) and Calculation of 
Goodness Score G (bottom) 
 
6.1. Geospatial and temporal filters 
 
In practice, geospatial and temporal constraints 
are key elements of many threat models. For 
instance, a threat model may contain events 𝐸1 and 
𝐸2 such that 𝐸1 always occurs before 𝐸2. The 
knowledge graph, however, as represented for the 
inexact matching algorithm execution, does not 
facilitate searches incorporating such constraints. The 
storage format consists of two sparse matrices, node-
to-node matrix N and node-to-attribute matrix A: 
 
𝑁 = [𝑛𝑖 , 𝑛𝑗]   𝑖, 𝑗 = (1, … , 𝑛) (2) 
 
 




where 𝑛 is the number of nodes and 𝑎 is the number of 
the attribute values. As constructed, N and A do not 
account for the spectrum of comparisons intrinsic to 
location and time. To address this deficiency, we 
developed two approaches, the extra nodes approach 
and the best rank neighbor approach. 
 
6.1.1 Extra nodes approach. During preprocessing 
stage, this approach inserts an extra node between all 
pairs of nodes with the two attributes being 
compared. Figure 15 displays an example of this 
process for a temporal constraint. As shown in the 
figure, to compare the time of an employment event 
to the time a person is traveling, a node is inserted 
between all nodes of type “Employment event” and 
of type “Person Travel.” The attributes of these 
additional nodes contain the difference in time or 
difference in longitude and latitude.  
 
Figure 15. Query Graph (top) Augmented to Include 
Temporal Constraint (bottom) 
 
The advantage of this approach is that the 
comparisons are embedded in the structure of the 
graph, so that the algorithm can continue to be used 
in the same way as before. The drawback is an 
increase in algorithm run time, arising both from the 
preprocessing required to augment the matrices N and 
A and from the added time needed to search the 
larger augmented matrices. 
 
6.1.2 Best rank neighbor approach. This approach 
takes advantage of the algorithm’s selection of high-
rank neighboring nodes to select the highest rank 
neighboring node that also matches the given 
temporal or geospatial requirements. For the query 
depicted in Figure 16, once a specific employment 
event is selected, the algorithm iterates through rank-
sorted neighbor nodes and ends the iteration once a 
neighbor node is found whose time of travel was 
prior to the time of the employment event.  
 
 
Figure 16. Queries For Run-Time Comparison 
 
Thereby, the algorithm finds the best ranked neighbor 
that meets the temporal requirement. This algorithm 
is nearly always faster than the extra nodes approach; 
the additional time comes only from iterating and 
comparing over the given attribute.  
    To compare run times for these approaches, we 
used a representative subset of the full knowledge 
graph. Since both algorithms scale linearly with 
graph size (number of nodes and number of edges), 
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the reported run time results can be extrapolated to 
estimate run times for the entire graph.  
 
 
Table 1. Run Time Results for Temporal 
Comparisons – Average of 20 Runs 
 
Table 1 shows that, while goodness scores are 
similar for both methods for the query depicted in 
Figure 16, the average run time for the best rank 
neighbor approach was about half that for the extra 
node approach. 
 
6.2. Graph subsampling 
 
For some search queries, large regions of the 
knowledge graph may yield no matches simply 
because the information stored there is not relevant to 
the query. Graph subsampling is a technique that can 
improve the run time of computationally intensive 
graph search algorithms by prohibiting them from 
entering such regions.  
 




Table 2. Run Time Results for Graph Subsampling 
 
Graph subsampling was implemented by 
restricting the algorithm to regions of the knowledge 
graph within n hops of any node that matches a node 
attribute or type in the query graph. For example, 
using the query in Figure 17 and choosing n = 2 hops 
to subsample the full knowledge graph cuts the 
number of edges and nodes that must be searched by 
factors of 2 and 3, respectively. Run time results for 
graph subsampling, averaged over 20 runs, are 
summarized in Table 2. Three matches were 
requested and three exact matches were found for 
both the full and subsampled graphs. The “Start to 
Finish Time” column lists time needed for graph 
subsampling plus return of three matching results. 
Graph subsampling is a preprocessing time cost and 
needs to be calculated only initially. 
  
7. Demonstrating the system: embedded 
scenario 
 
To demonstrate the capabilities of the system, we 
embedded a scenario within the knowledge graph 
based on the threat model of Figure 12. The 
scientist’s online connection to an individual of 
interest involves either communication with or 
following an account of a radicalized person. The 
event of interest here is a travel event to a virology 
conference. We are interested in matches that show 
both individuals traveling to the same conference. 
 
 
Figure 18. Scenario Results 
 
 Table 3. Embedded Scenario Statistics 
 
The exact graph matching results are shown in  
Figure 18. Larger clusters (1, 2, 4, and 7) represent 
individuals who match one of these four 
characteristics, while the smaller clusters (3, 5, and 6) 
represent individuals who match two or more 
characteristics. Cluster 6 contains individuals of 
highest interest because they possess or are linked to 
all criteria specified by the threat model. 
Table 3 presents embedded scenario statistics, 
showing that the system is able to filter the number of 
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individuals of interest from tens of thousands to 
three, potentially vastly reducing analyst workloads. 
Examples of inexact matches to a similar threat 
model are shown in Figure 13 in Section 6. The 
analyst’s or subject matter expert’s input would be 
needed to determine if those matches are of interest. 
 
8. Conclusions and future work 
 
This paper presents an end-to-end approach for 
detecting threats within large volumes of multi-modal 
data. A knowledge base, represented as a graph, is 
constructed in an automated fashion to include 
relevant data from disparate data sources. An 
approach for generating threat models that reflect a 
SME’s threat understanding is introduced, and 
methods for retrieving both exact and inexact 
instances of the complex threat model from the 
knowledge base are described. We demonstrate 
efficient retrieval performance on a graph of 38M 
nodes and 140M edges and describe enhancements to 
the current state of the art for linearly scaling inexact 
subgraph matching that significantly reduce run times 
while maintaining high match scores. We also 
present new methods for discovering threat models 
with spatial and temporal links. Finally we show how 
the system can detect embedded threats within a large 
knowledge base. While improvements can be made 
to every step of the processing chain, particularly 
graph construction and graph matching, we believe 
the system provides a needed capability with 
sufficient speed for providing useful, timely 
indications and warning.    
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